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RECOVERY OF THE INDIRECT PROFITS
OF WRONGFUL KILLING: THE NEW
CONSTRUCTIVE TRUST AND THE OLSON CASE

John D. McCamus*
The decision of Trainor J. of the British Columbia
Supreme Court in Rosenfeldt v. Olson (1984), 20 E.T.R. 133, is
boldly innovative. Having murdered 11 children, Clifford Olson
agreed to provide incriminating information concerning the
remains of his victims to the R.C.M.P. in exchange for the
payment of money into a trust held for the benefit of his wife
and child. No doubt legal advisors on both sides of this
transaction had some reason to believe that its structure
would, or at least might, prevent the application of the general
principle that a person who wrongfully kills another will not be
allowed to enjoy profit resulting from the act of killing.
Nonetheless, the plaintiff parents of the victims pursued a
claim based, in part, on this principle against Olson, his wife,
and the two lawyers who assisted Olson in this matter,
McNeney who agreed to act as trustee and Shantz, his defence
counsel, who provided initial advice with respect to the
structure of the transaction. Trainor J. ultimately held that
the trust fund, at the time of its creation, became impressed
with a constructive trust in favour of the plaintiffs in order to
"remove it" from the wrongdoer Olson, from those collaborating
with him, i.e., McN eney and Shantz, and from those whose
claim is through him, i.e., his wife and their child.
Although the decision is indeed innovative, it is important
to note as a preliminary matter that it draws on two bodies of
doctrine that are marked by a history of creative decisionmaking. The first area is that surrounding the "wrongful
killing'' principle, i.e., the principle that one ought not be
permitted to profit from wrongful killing. The second is the
device of the constructive trust. In common law Canada and
in the United States, the constructive trust has demonstrated a
remarkable capacity for evolution and growth. Before turning
to the specifics of the problem in Olson, it will be useful to
elaborate on these points in a brief introductory fashion.
With the abolition of attainder and forfeiture of the
property of criminals in the 19th century (in Canada see the
Criminal Code, R.s.c. 1970, c. ,C-34, s. 5(1)(b)) Courts were
confronted· with a number of situations in which application of
the ordinary rules of private law doctrine would appear to
permit murderers to acquire benefits as a result of their crime
which might not otherwise be available to them. Thus, the
* John D. McCamus is the Dean, Osgoode Hall Law School,
York University.
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murderer may be entitled to a share in the victim's estate,
either through the victim's will or on an intestacy. The
murderer might be a beneficiary of an insurance policy written
on the life of the deceased. In each of these situations, the
Courts responded by holding that the murderer was unable to
enjoy benefits of this kind. This required the Courts to refuse
to apply the normal rules of contract or inheritance and, in
the case of intestacy of course, to read a good deal into the
provisions of intestacy statutes which are normally silent on
this point. (See, e.g., Re Johnson, [ 1950] 1 W.w .R. 263, 57
Man. R. 438, [1950] 2 D.L.R. 69 (Man.)) What might be
thought to be more difficult cases arise when the killing simply
advances the enjoyment of an existing right as where a joint
tenant murders the co-tenant and, through the right of
survivorship, becomes entitled to the deceased's undivided share
of the property in question. In an Ontario case of this kind,
Schobelt v. Barber, [1967] 1 O.R. 349, 60 D.L.R. (2d) 519,
Moorhouse J. rejected the argument that refusal to allow the
murderer to take the entire property "would be a further
penalty on the survivor who has been sentenced for the crime
of which he has already been convicted ••• and a return to
the principle of forfeiture which has been abolished by the
Criminal Code •••" at pp. 353-54. The device chosen by
Moorhouse J. for "compelling the murderer to surrender the
profits of his crime and thus (prevent) ••• his unjust
enrichment" at pp. 354-55 was to allow the deceased's interest
to pass at law but to impress it with a constructive trust
requiring the survivor to hold the interest as constructive
trustee for the benefit of the victim's heirs and devisees.
The tension manifest in these cases between the need to
give meaning to the statutory abolition of attainder and
forfeiture on the one hand, and the understandable desire on
the other to ensure that murderers do not profit from their
wrongdoing has led to some rather fine distinctions and to
rather creative analysis. Schobelt is a case in point. While
Moorhouse J. was of the view that the imposition of the
constructive trust in the fashion he prescribed was satisfactory,
he felt that an outright refusal to allow the property of the
deceased to pass to the murderer at law would be inconsistent
with the statutory policy. It will occasion no surprise that
decisions of this kind and this problem set more generally have
attracted considerable attention in the law reviews. See, for
example, T.G. Youdan, "Acquisition of Property by Killing"
(1973), 89 L.Q.R. 235; T.K. Earnshaw and P.J. Pace, "Let the
Hand Receiving it be Ever So Chaste" (1974), 37 M.L.R. 481;
N.M. Tarnow, "Unworthy Heirs: The Application of the Public
Policy Rule in the Administration of Estates" (1980), 58 Can.
Bar Rev. 582. The overwhelming impression one garners from
a reading of the case-law is that the Courts have been very
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willing to develop novel approaches in order to ensure that
killers are prevented from enjoying the profits of their crime
that might otherwise accrue to them. In this sense, at least,
Olson is consistent with tradition.
One final point should be made with respect to the caselaw on wrongful killing. Many observers would see this area of
the law as manifesting an even broader principle that
wrongdoers are not permitted to profit by their wrongs at the
expense of others. Such observers would see a family
resemblance between the wrongful killing cases and the caselaw on waiver of tort which permits the victim of a tort to
recover the tortfeasor's profits, even where they exceed the
victim's loss. (See, generally, J. Beatson, "The Nature of
Waiver of Tort" (1979), 17 u.w.o. L. Rev. 1) The broader
principle would also be said to be reflected in the principles
allowing recovery of profits from faithless fiduciaries and a
broad range of other situations in which equity intervenes to
prevent those who engage in conduct equity views as wrongful
from profitting thereby (such as the doctrines of undue
influence, unconscionability, etc.). Indeed, recovery of the
profits of wrongdoing is identified by restitution scholars as
one of the great organizing themes of the law of res.titution.
Accordingly, modern restitution texts will include discussion of
the wrongful killing cases, along with accounts of waiver of
tort, fiduciary obligation and other forms of equitable
wrongdoing. (See, for example, R. Goff and G. Jones, The
Law of Restitution (2nd ed., 1978); G.H.L. Fridman and J.
McLeod, The Law of Restitution (1982))
The other body of doctrine on which Trainor J. relied
might be referred to as the new constructive trust. A full
account of the development of the constructive trust would
necessitate a brief history of the emergence of the modern law
of restitution. For obvious reasons, this will not be attempted
here, but it is possible to briefly advert to these developments.
The most important development in that history was the
publication, in 1937, of the Restatement of Restitution. The
organizing thesis of the Restatement was that the law of
quasi-contract and the law of constructive trust could usefully
be brought together and analyzed together as a coherent body
of doctrine presenting solutions to problems of unjust
enrichment. The traditional ideas that quasi-contracts were, in
some sense, real contracts and that constructive trusts were,
similarly, real trusts created the false impression in each case
that the obligation in question arose, in part at least, from
express or implied consent. Clear thinking about these subjects
would be enhanced, it was argued, if they were seen to consist
of rules imposing obligations in order to prevent an unjust
enrichment. In the case of constructive trust, it was to be
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properly characterized, then, not as a substantive trust, but as
a remedial device available in some cases of unjust enrichment.
For present purposes, it is sufficient to note that the
Restatement's analysis has established a firm foothold in the
Canadian and U.s. case-law on quasi-contract and constructive
trust. In addition to works previously cited, see, generally,
J .D. McCamus, "The Restitutionary Remedy of Constructive
Trust", in Special Lectures of the L.S.U.C.: New Developments
in the Law of Remedies (1981), p. 85; J.L. Dewar, 11 The
Development of the Remedial Constructive Trust (1982), Can.
Bar Rev. 265; G. Klippert, Unjust Enrichment (1983). For an
account of American law, see G. Palmer, The Law of
Restitution (1978)) Although the Restatement, as its title
would suggest, was principally an attempt to restate and
clarify existing doctrine, the promulgation of a clearer view of
the nature of the obligations imposed in these cases has
facilitated an extension of prior law to new factual situations.
Thus, in Pettkus v. Becker, [1980] 2 S.C.R. 834, 8 E.T.R. 143,
19 R.F.L. (2d) 165, 117 D.L.R. (3d) 257, 34 N.R. 384, the
Supreme Court of Canada not only adopted the Restatement's
view of the remedial nature of the constructive trust, but
applied it in a novel way to ensure that separating _spouses
fairly divided properties which were accumulated as a result ~f
their joint effort. Schobelt v. Barber, referred to above, is
another illustration of the willingness of Courts to adopt this
device in new circumstances but, more generally, it should be
noted that the principal difference between North American
and English case-law on "wrongful killing", is the willingness of
Canadian and U.S. Courts to use the constructive trust in this
context in order to prevent unjust enrichment of the killer.
Thus, in drawing on the resources of the new constructive trust
in the Olson case, Trainor J. was working within an area of
doctrine marked by an unusual degree of elasticity.
If novelty, per se, is unexceptionable in these
circumstances, we must nonetheless ask whether the extension
of prior law in Olson is soundly based. A number of
interesting issues arise. First, it must be asked whether, as a
general matter, it is sensible to extend the application of the
wrongful killing rule .to what might be referred to as indirect
or incidental benefits of the kind at issue here. More
particularly, should payments made in aid of a criminal
investigation be recoverable? Should the type of recovery
allowed in Olson be extended to such items as royalties earned
by the killer from books recounting his misdeeds? What was
the significance, if any, of the fact that the moneys were
settled in a trust for Olson's wife? Why is it that the parents
should be considered entitled to make this particular claim?
Each of these issues will be discussed in turn.
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Direct v. Indirect Benefits of Wrongful Killing

In all previous cases in which recovery on the basis of
the wrongful killing principle has been allowed, the benefit
accrued to the murderer was simply, or one might say directly,
as a result of the killing. That is to say, on the basis of a
pre-existing state of legal affairs, be it a will, insurance
contract or a joint tenancy, the fact of the victim's death
gave rise to the enjoyment of a benefit. In Olson, on the
other hand, the commission of the crimes did, of course,
provide the opportunity for securing the benefit in question,
but it clearly resulted from subsequent conduct in the form of
negotiations with the R.C.M.P. and the entering into of an
agreement to establish a trust fund. Royalties would be
another case in point. The crime provides the opportunity for
profit but subsequent and different activity is required to
actually generate the profit.
The extension of the rule to indirect profits of this kind
might be attacked on a number of grounds. First, it might be
suggested that the disabling of a criminal from generating
profit by subsequent and different conduct conflicts with the
policies underlying the abolition of attainder and forfeiture and,
indeed, that the recovery of indirect profits more obviously
conflicts with these policies than the recovery of direct
profits. As a result . of the crime, a civil incapacity to enter
into subsequent arrangements of certain kinds is imposed.
On the contrary, however, it would appear that the
recovery of indirect profits is no greater an incursion on the
capacity of the criminal than the recovery of direct profits.
It is not at all obvious that it is more offensive to strike down
existing arrangements such as wills and insurance contracts
than to prevent the criminal from exploiting, in a particular
way, an opportunity for profit which arises only because of the
criminal's wrongdoing. Indeed, it might be felt that a rule
which attacks profits of the latter kind is more closely linked
to the rationale of the wrongful killing rule than cases like
Schobelt v. Barber.
Another objection to the extension to indirect benefits
might be that the causal link between the killing and the
profit is broken in such cases and that the chain of causation
present in cases of direct profit is essential to the argument
that recovery in such cases does not undermine the antiforfeiture principle. Again, however, there is a persuasive
argument to the contrary. In cases of direct benefit, it is not
true that the killing is in some sense an independent cause of
the profit. In each case there is a pre-existing legal
arrangement or entitlement which is simply triggered by the
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death of the victim. It is not essential to recovery in such
cases that the killing be part of an elaborate scheme to
acquire the benefit in question.
As a matter of general principle, then, there appears to
be no reason for an absolute preclusion of the recovery of
indirect benefits. When one considers the particular cases. of
payments made to secure incriminating evi~en:e and royal~ies
from autobiographical accounts of criminal wrongdoing,
however, more particular objections to recovery emerge.
Payments in Aid of Investigation
The principal objection to the granting o~ recover~ of the
payment made in Olson is that a rule which permits. s.uch
recovery has the effect of disabling law e!1force.ment . off!cia~s
from using this particular device as an aid to investigation m
the future. If one accepts, as did Trainor J., that the case
against Olson was otherwi~e rat~er. "thin" and its s~ccessful
prosecution was therefore unllkely, it is not at all obvious. that
it would be in the public interest to refuse to barter with a
criminal in this fashion. Certainly, it may be seriously
questioned whether it would not be more desirable to. l~ave the
difficult policy choice to senior law enforcement officials and
the political process rather than the judiciary. In Olson, the
payment was ultimate!~ approv~d by the .Attor~ey .General ~f
British Columbia and, mdeed, it was Trainor J. s view that his
handling of the matter was beyond reproach (Reasons, p. 136).
The decision to make the payment was obviously a difficult
one, involving a balancing of a number of po~icy consideratio!18·
Where the decision has been made responsibly and at a high
and politically accountable level, there is much to be s~id for
a judicial reluctance to interve!le in. sue~ a way as to virtually
preclude the exercise of such discretion m the future.
Further it should be noted that the potential scope of
the Olson de~ision is considerable. As Trainor J. indicated,
"Experience has shown that it i~ often necessary in .order to
secure evidence and to solve crimes for peace officer~ . to
protect or assist witnesses or their dependents by prov1dmg
maintenance, relocation and other expenses, change of
identities and safe accommodation" (Reasons,. P: 137) •. Many
of these "witnesses" will, of course, be participants m th.e
crime in question who may or may not have excha~ged their
willingness to testify for an .immuni~y !rom prosecution. All
such recipients are potentially withm the scope of the new
rule. If one assumes, as Trainor J. does, that the Crown must
be permitted to confer benefits of this. kind on wrongdoers,
how is one to distinguish from these benefits, payments of the
kind made in the Olson case?
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Trainor J. attempted to distinguish permissible conferrals
such as maintenance and relocation costs from the Olson
payment in the following fashion. "The line drawn over the
years is that a wrongdoer should not benefit from his crime.
There is a rule of public policy, said to be an integral part of
our law, which precludes a person benefitting from his own
crime" (Reasons, p. 138). This appears to be an attempt to
distinguish "profits" in some sense from benefits which merely
insulate the wrongdoer from the negative consequences that
would otherwise flow from his detection or from his known
willingness to testify at the trials of others, i.e., from benefits
which, in some sense, merely preserve the status quo.
The suggested distinction is not entirely convincing. The
provision of these "necessaries" may be much more valuable to
the recipient than a lump sum payment and, indeed, a much
more expensive matter for the Crown. Further, to the extent
that maintenance costs are supplied in the form of what is in
effect a salary, any savings generated would appear to be
indistinguishable from the payment made in the Olson case.
No doubt some would view a generitt attack on the ability
of the Crown to provide benefits of this kind to criminal
wrongdoers as desirable. There may be some feeling that the
provision of such benefits will too easily become a substitute
for more effective investigation by the Crown. This, however,
is a problem inherent in the general use of paid informants and
is not peculiar to the case of informants who are also
participants in a crime. We appear to be satisfied, as a
general matter, to allow law enforcement officials a discretion
to determine when the use of paid informants is an
investigative device that must be used in the particular case.
Certainly the Supreme Court of Canada is supportive of the
use of informers. See, e.g., Bissaillon v. Keable, [1983] 2
S.C.R. 60, 4 Admin. L.R. 205, 37 C.R. (3d) 289, 7 C.C.C. (3d)
385, 2 D.L.R. (4th) 193. There would be no reason to have
less confidence in the exercise of this discretion in dealings
with participants.
Nor would it be realistic to oppose payments to
participants on the ground that a practice of this kind might
create an incentive to criminal misconduct. There is, however,
a chilling passage in the Olson judgment in which Trainor J.
describes an attempt by Olson, at an early point in the
investigation of the killings, to be hired by the R.C.M.P. as an
informant at a salary of $3,000 per month. The R.C.M.P.
denied the request. Later that same day, Olson murdered
another child (Reasons, p. 139). Perhaps it is possible that
there are individuals so disturbed they might commit crimes
with a view to providing a demand for their services as
informants, or in order to provide an opportunity to secure
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other kinds of benefits. As a more general matter, however,
the circumstances in which such benefits can be negotiated are
so rare and precarious that it seems unlikely that the
occasional conferral of such benefits would create any
meaningful incentive to criminal conduct.
In short, the holding in Olson, insofar as it constrains the
ability of the Crown to utilize the provision of benefits as an
investigative device, may be undesirable on policy grounds.
Perhaps one could identify lump sum payments to participants
as especially offensive, and therefore recoverable. The
preferable view, it is submitted, is that the ability of the
Crown to utilize this device, at least in cases where its use
has the approval of the senior law officer of the Crown, should
not be undermined by a general rule permitting subsequent
recovery of the payment. This is not to say, however, that
there may not be some attraction to a rule which would
permit recovery where the circumstances or amount of the
payment are such as to shock the conscience of the Court. It
might indeed be helpful to the Crown to bargain in the shadow
of such a rule. In the particular case of payments to
witnesses, the Crown is. constrained to make reasonable
arrangements, of course, by the need to avoid any impression
that the witness has been bribed. See Palmer v. R., [1980] 1
S.C.R. 759, 14 C.R. (3d) 22, 17 C.R. (3d) 34, 50 C.C.C. (2d)
194, 106 D.L.R. (3D) 212 at 228 (sub nom. R. v. Palmer), 30
N.R. 1~1 (S.C.C.): . A more ge1?-eral rule of the kind suggested
would impose a similar constramt on payments to criminals
who will not be testifying. Further, it might well be desirable
to permit the Crown itself to assert a more generalized cause
of action in cases of this kind. We will return to this point
below.
Royalties.
Lump sum payments of the kind made in Olson are, of
course, likely to be rare. A more obvious target of a rule
permitting the recovery of indirect profits would be royalties
and other compensation earned by criminals for the publication
of personal accounts of their misdeeds. In Olson itself
reference is made by Trainor J. to legal costs absorbed in th~
negotiation of a publication agreement. There does not appear
to be any principled basis set forth in the Olson analysis that
would preclude recovery of indirect profits of this kind.
In the United States, the understandable concern felt by
many at the prospect of handsome profits of this kind has led
to the enactment of statutes in a number of states that make
available to victims the money earned by criminals from the
re-enactment of their crimes, whether through the writing amd
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publication of a book or through any other medium of
communication or entertainment. (See, generally, S. Clark,
"The Son-of-Sam Laws: When the Lunatic, the Criminal, the
Poet are of Imagination All Compact" (1983), St. Louis U.L.J.
207 .) The Olson case might very well be taken to establish a
common law basis for similar claims and again, therefore, it
must be asked whether a recovery of this kind is soundly based
in public policy.
It will occasion no surprise that some observers are of
the view that the U.S. statutory schemes are of dubious
constitutional validity. One would expect that a statute which
removes incentives to the publication of views would be
vulnerable on First Amendment grounds. Nonetheless, there
does not yet appear to have been a successful constitutional
challenge to any of the U.S. statutes. No doubt a Canadian
statute would be subject to similar scrutiny under the Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms.
Leaving aside the technical question of the
constitutionality of such statutes and the question of the
impact of unconstitutionality upon the capacity of the Courts
to permit analagous relief at common law, it is obvious that a
persuasive argument can be made against recovery of this kind
on policy grounds. As a general matter, the publication of
such works is desirable for a number of reasons. They may
communicate ideas and information to the public that will
inform debate on important questions. They may provide
information that law enforcement agencies and criminologists
would find useful in combatting or studying crime. They may
have the effect of discouraging others from engaging in
criminal conduct. They may have literary or other artistic or
cultural value. The process of creation may have a
rehabilitative effect on their authors. The fact that any
particular work fails to accomplish any or all of these
objectives is not a reason for discouraging publication of the
entire genre. Accordingly, a rule which removes any incentive
for publication may be thought undesirable on policy grounds.
It may be answered that there are other motivations for
creating works of this kind, and that the removal of financial
incentives will therefore not seriously restrict the flow of this
sort of material. No doubt this might be true in many cases,
but as a general matter, it seems likely that the motivation of
personal profit must play an important role in encouraging the
production of such works. Nonetheless, as the enactment of
legislation in the United States indicates, there is considerable
public sentiment against allowing profits of this kind.
An intermediate solution that might satisfactorily
reconcile the conflicting interests in encouraging publication
and removing profits would be to permit criminals to enjoy
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modest rewards for activity of this kind. Thus, a statutory
scheme could set a maximum on the level of compensation to
be enjoyed from these projects. Such a provision might
buttress the statute from constitutional attack although, no
doubt, it would also bring with it a number of difficulties of
definition and implementation. A similar approach could be
taken at common law by allowing recovery only of profits that
are in excess of the level of compensation normally available
to published authors or, perhaps, a reasonable quantum meruit
for the service rendered in creating the work. In the absence
of a solution of this kind, it may be that the preferable
solution is to deny victims the right to pursue these profits
with a constructive trust and leave them to assert such other
civil remedies as may be available against the criminal author.
The Significance of the Trust

An interesting issue which surfaced in Olson was whether
the payment of the moneys into a trust fund for the benefit of
Olson's wife and child would preclude application of the
wrongful killing principle. Obviously, it was the view of
Olson's counsel that this might ·be the case. Clearly, Trainor
J. was troubled by this point as well, as it attracted much
attention in his reasons for judgment.
It is important to note the narrowness of the holding in
Olson on this point. It was Trainor J .'s view that the
circumstances and manner of the creation of the trust were
not such as to support an argument of this kind on behalf of
the defendants. More particularly, the fact that at the time
of its creation, Olson and his lawyer were making certain
arrangements for the disposition of some portion of the trust
moneys, together with the fact that Olson obviously influenced
subsequent use of the moneys, led Trainor J. to conclude that
the fund was not established in such a way as to place the
moneys beyond his dominion and control.
It was thus unnecessary for Trainor J. to determine what
the effect of the trust would have been if it had been properly
created and implemented. Nonetheless, he ultimately concluded
that the device would likely be unsuccessful on the ground that
any payment to the killer's wife "would likely be found to be a
benefit to him 11 (Reasons, p. 163).
Certainly, there is much force to the view that payments
to Olson's wife would constitute a benefit to him. An
underlying reason for this, not mentioned by Trainor J., is that
Olson was, of course, subject to a legal obligation to provide
support to his wife and child. Accordingly, payments to them
for this purpose would partially discharge this obligation of his.
In restitutionary terms, discharge of another's obligation is
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normally considered to be a benefit to that other person. The
fact that Olson has benefitted, however, should not settle the
question of his wife's liability. The fact that he has benefitted
might well ground a claim in restitution against him. If Mrs.
Olson is to be required to repay the moneys received, it must
be because she is affected by an equitable duty to restore the
moneys which is, in a sense, derivative of the equitable duty
that Olson himself would have had, had he received the funds.
As a donee, indeed a donee with knowledge of the
circumstances in which the fund was created, she could be in
no better position in equity than her husband. Indeed, Trainor
J. appears to appreciate this point and relies on authority for
the proposition that in cases of equitable wrongdoing, the duty
to restore benefits cannot be evaded by placing them in the
hands of innocent third parties (Reasons, pp. 162-63).
What is less certain, however, is the source of Olson's
equitable duty to restore the fund. Although there is a
suggestion by Trainor J. that the original transaction might be
unconscionable, this might be a difficult point to sustain.
Surely the equitable duty arises, if at all, because of the
application of the wrongful killing principle and a determination
by the Court that it is appropriate to make the remedial
devices of equity available to the plaintiff. Once it is
accepted that such a duty arises, the liability of Mrs. Olson
(and other recipients of the trust moneys other than bona fide
purchasers for value without notice) follows without difficulty.
The creation of a trust fund, therefore, should not be
considered an absolute bar to relief.
It is conceivable, however, that the Courts might consider
the creation of such funds relevant for the following reason.
It has been argued above that in the case of investigative
payments, at least, Courts should be reluctant to undermine
the ability of the Crown to employ payments of this kind to
assist investigations or prosecutions by permitting victims or
others to recover as a general rule. It was further suggested,
however, that there might well be some advantage to a rule
which permitted the Courts to intervene where the amount or
circumstances of the payment shocked the conscience of the
Court. Presumably, the creation of a trust fund for the
benefit of innocent third parties might be considered an
appropriate factor to take into account in determining whether
or not the arrangement in question does in fact shock the
conscience of the Court.
Are the Parents Entitled to Assert the Claim!

Another interesting feature of the Olson decision is that
the ultimate award was made in favour of the parents of the
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victims. The basis for their entitlement as opposed to that of
other conceivable claimants is not at all clear. Trainor J.
attempted to support this aspect of his decision in the
following manner (Reasons, p. 164):
"The reasons underlying the establishment of the fund
were that it would likely result in the conviction of a
mass murderer, that it would bring to a conclusion a
lengthy and expensive investigation, that there would be a
lessening of public anxiety and that the finality would
bring some solace to the parents of the murdered
children. That describes the character of the fund and
directs its future use."
This is an ingenious approach to the problem of linking the
claim of the parents to the fund. Although it is true that the
original payment was motivated by a number of purposes, only
one - the bringing of solace to the parents - has not yet been
accomplished. No doubt the outrage and grief of the parents
may well have been intensified by the establishment of the
fund and its dismantling might well bring some small comfort.
It must be asked, however, whether there are not other
potential plaintiffs whose claims appear to be as strong or
stronger than those of the parents. We will consider the
possible claims of the Crown, the victims and other creditors.
The Crown
At first impression, it might appear that the Crown has a
more compelling claim to the fund. The Crown, after all, paid
the money into the trust. If, as is the case, the most
compelling unjust enrichment claim arises where unjust benefit
is found to be at the expense of the plaintiff, it is only the
Crown that can directly link the corpus of the trust to a
direct and precisely equivalent financial cost to itself. Perhaps
it is not entirely clear that such a claim would lie on existing
principles. The transaction entered into with Olson and his
lawyers might appear to be vulnerable either on grounds of
coercion, broadly construed, or illegality. The former seems an
unlikely basis for setting a transaction aside. Notwithstanding
the gradual expansion of doctrines of compulsion and
unconscionability in Canadian law, it would be surprising if the
Crown were to be characterized as having entered so carefully
considered a transaction on what is essentially an involuntary
or uninformed basis. There is obviously a strong argument to
the effect that the agreement is unenforceable on illegality
grounds and yet, would all agreements to pay informers be
unenforceable on illegality grounds? If not, why would they be
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so when entered into with a participant? This question takes
us back to a number of the considerations already discussed
with respect to the desirability of permitting the Crown to
make arrangements of this kind. Nonetheless, if we assume, as
seems likely, that such agreements would be held
unenforceable, it is a distinct and further question whether any
payments made by the Crown would be recoverable on
restitutionary grounds. Unless the Crown were found to be in
pari delicto with respect to the illegality of the transaction,
the Crown would presumably be able to recover payments
made. For the sake of argument, then, let us assume that the
law enforcement agency making payments of this kind would be
entitled to recover them.
In Olson, of course, the R.C.M.P. chose not to seek
recovery because "it (did) not want to appear to go back on its
word" (Reasons, p. 161). Should the failure of the R.C.M.P. to
assert its (perhaps higher) claim stand in the way of the lesser
claim of .the parents? Again, we confront the question,
considered above, of the desirability of permitting the Crown
to make effective arrangements of this kind. It is sufficient
at this point to note that one could defend, on policy grounds,
a rule which prevented third parties (such as victims and their
parents) from disrupting such arrangements but, at the same
time, allowed the Crown to set aside such transactions and
recover payments made. · On the other hand, if one assumes,
as was argued above, that the Courts should exercise an
overriding discretion to strike down arrangements which they
find unacceptable, it may well be that the law enforcement
agency in question will feel that it must abide by the
arrangement and accordingly, it is not an unattractive solution
to expose the criminal wrongdoer to the claims (and the
underlying outrage) of the victims and their families.
More generally, if one accepts the proposition that
criminal wrongdoers should be deprived of incidental profits, it
will be necessary to recognize the claims of third parties. In
many cases, as in the case of book royalties, the supplier of
the profit may have no claim whatsoever against the
wrongdoer, quite apart from any inclination to enforce it.
Moreover, it is not an unprecedented phenomenon in the
general area of the recovery of profits of wrongdoing for
claims to be brought by plaintiffs who cannot be said to have
sustained a loss which is equivalent to the defendant's gain.
This is clearly so in the context of waiver of tort and
fiduciary duty cases {see the discussions in Goff and Jones, op.
cit., supra, and Palmer, op. cit., supra.) Indeed, from a case
like Reading v. A.G., [ 1951] A.C. 507, one gains the
impression that in cases of this kind, the Courts will be rather
creative in articulating the basis for providing a nexus between
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a plaintiff who has suffered no loss and a defendant who has
profitted from criminal activity. In Reading, a British noncommissioned officer resident in Egypt who obtained moneys in
return for providing illicit services to Egyptians who were,
simply stated, defrauding Egyptian authorities, was required to
disgorge his ill-gotten gains to the British Crown.
Victims
As has been indicated above, in the previous case-law on
wrongful killing, the claimants have normally been the victims
themselves or, rather, their estates. Obviously t.he victims
have a much stronger claim than the parents, and there would
appear to be no reason to depart from past practice in this
regard on the facts of the Olson case. This may be viewed as
a merely technical objection to the manner in which the Olson
claim has been pleaded, inasmuch as it seems likely that many
of the victims would not have testamentary capacity and, in
any event, claims on behalf of the children could appropriately
be brought by the parents with the ultimate result that
recovery would enure to the benefit of the parents.
Nonetheless, as between the parents and the victims, it would
seem that the latter have the stronger claim and, indeed, if
the victims or their representatives did not wish to pursue a
particular claim, it is not at all obvious that the parents
should be entitled to pursue independent relief.
Other Creditors
The effect of imposing a constructive trust on the
defendents is, of course, to create a priority for the plaintiff
class. This appears not to have been clearly understood by
Trainor J. inasmuch as the penultimate paragraph in his
judgment seems to suggest that it might be possible for other
claimants to come forward and assert rights against the
recaptured trust fund. One possible claim to bring against the
defendants in Olson would have been a creditors' suit, in which
the plaintiffs would attempt to recover assets of the debtor,
i.e. Olson, and restore them to the debtor so that they are
available not only to the plaintiff creditors but to creditors as
a class more generally. For a brief discussion of creditors'
suits, see J.D. McCamus, "The Self-Serving Intermeddler and
the Law of Restitution" (1978), 16 Osgoode Hall L.J. 515. In
such a case, other creditors would indeed share the bounty.
Those who did so could be required to bear a portion of the
cost of the original litigation. This was not, however, the
nature of the claim brought in the Olson case. The parents
sought to assert a theory of obligation giving rise to the
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constructive trust which, again, would create a priority for
them over other creditors.
The remaining question, then, is whether a basis for such
a priority can be successfully articulated. The decision in
Schobelt v. Barber does not offer direct assistance. Perhaps
the imposition of the constructive trust on the Schobelt facts
rests, in part at least, <;m the fact that the profit acquired by
the criminal is proprietary in nature. It may well be that the
reason for giving what is, in effect, a priority to the victim's
estate in these cases rests also on a belief that the injury of
the victim and his or her devisees is rather different from the
losses of the general run of creditors and ought to be given
more favourable treatment. Certainly, if the priority affected
by the constructive trust remedy is to be utilized in this
context, its justification must rest on considerations of this
kind.
Conclusion

The problems inherent in the claim brought by the
parents in the Olson case are as intriguing as the solutions
proposed by Trainor J. in his reasons for judgment. It has
been argued above that recovery of what have been referred to
here as indirect profits of wrongful killing should be potentially
recoverable as a matter of general principle. As well, it has
been argued that in the case of both payments of the kind
made in the Olson case and other kinds of indirect profits such
as royalties from book publishing, there are serious
considerations weighing against a principle which would allow
recovery of all such profits. Finally, it has been suggested
that either or both of the victims themselves or the R.C.M.P.
would appear to be more suitable plaintiffs than the parents of
the victim, although it was further suggested that on the
particular facts of the Olson case this might be considered to
be an objection of a rather technical and unmeritorious nature
as far as the standing of the parents is concerned.
No doubt some observers will see the decision in Olson as
further support for the proposition that "hard cases make bad
law". Another view is possible, however, as I have attempted
to demonstrate. It may well be that the Olson decision will
be seen to have opened a new and very interesting chapter in
the long history of the evolution of the wrongful killing
principle.

